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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The purpose of this research design was to make recommendations to Louisville
Metro Council Members, members of the Kentucky General Assembly from Jefferson County
and Louisville Metro Mayor Jerry Abramson on the potential revenue and economic impact a
potential franchise of the National Basketball Association (NBA) could have on the proposed
Louisville Arena Project and the city of Louisville.
Research in the literature review showed that stadiums, arenas and professional
teams are poor investments by communities. Despite the research, the new Louisville Arena
is going to be built because the Kentucky General Assembly included $75-million in bond
financing for the Louisville Arena and the city of Louisville has already pledged their bonding
capacity to help pay a third of the cost. One of the major components lacking is research to
show if a professional team can help subsidize an arena that is already in existence and as a
result, making it a “dual-use” facility.
The proposed Louisville Arena project must have 113 dates annually to operate at a
“break even” level. Currently, 138 events take place in Freedom Hall annually according to
the Leib Group, consultants for the new Louisville Arena project, but only a portion of those
events are expected to move to the new arena when it opens. As a result, Louisville
lawmakers are going to need to start looking at ways to subsidize the debt service
obligations and the question this study addresses is if an NBA team could do just that.
The results of a study by the University of Memphis show that 58% of visitors in
attendance for their dual-use arena, the FedExForum, would be from outside the city of
Memphis. This study is critical to the Louisville/Metro area in that Louisville and Memphis
are comparable size demographically and financially. This study also indicated these visitors
would arrive solely to attend an NBA game. Therefore, any money these visitors bring into
Louisville/Jefferson County for an NBA game represents new money to Louisville, but not
necessarily to the state.
Comparisons of the proposed Louisville Arena to NBA arenas located in cities of a
similar market size to Louisville indicate that the proposed single-use facility is adequate
enough to serve as a dual-use facility. Results also revealed that if an NBA team were
attracted to the city of Louisville, $24 million (available in Table 7) in new revenues could be
generated for the city of Louisville and the Louisville Arena Authority by having a dual-use
facility. This is largely due to the NBA providing new “entertainment” to the community
because an NBA team draws from a larger market base. There is also the reality that
currently not a single major-league professional team of any type in the state of Kentucky.
This contrasts with the University of Louisville men’s and women’s basketball teams which
would simply move the entertainment money from one location (Freedom Hall) to another
location in downtown Louisville.
Incentives and the probability of attracting a potential NBA franchise to Louisville
were addressed, as was a discussion on how the arena would still be able to issue taxexempt bonds, even if one of the “primary” tenants is a privately held professional basketball
team. Recommendations were made based on the results of the economic and revenue
impact analysis. The recommendations provide a different perspective on how an NBA team
can move into a community and help bring in new revenue and visitors.
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PROBLEM STATEMENT
The idea of state and local governments supporting sports facilities in the
community is not new. Cities, counties and states have historically played a
critical role in the development of sports facilities such as baseball stadiums,
football stadiums, basketball and hockey arenas and racetracks.
Kentucky’s largest city, Louisville, finds itself in the midst of a controversy
and debate. State and local officials are debating on the construction of a new
arena for the University of Louisville men’s basketball team. The current
estimate on the cost of the arena is in excess of $350-million, with the state of
Kentucky pledging $75 million and the city of Louisville using its bonding
authority to help pay nearly a third of the cost.
The proposal of an arena is not a new one for the city of Louisville.
However, the idea of constructing a dual-use facility has not yet been offered as
an alternative. With a dual purpose arena, two primary tenants- the University of
Louisville, as well as a potential NBA franchise, could utilize the facility as the
main “anchors” of the arena. The focus of this paper is not where the Louisville
Arena is to be built, or if the arena should even be built- rather, should lawmakers
in Louisville construct the arena as a “single” or a “dual-use” arena? Could an
NBA team potentially subsidize the debt service payments and more importantly,
bring in new money to Louisville and Jefferson County?
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OVERVIEW OF THE LOUISVILLE ARENA PROJECT
Throughout the last ten years, the construction of a new arena for the
University of Louisville men’s basketball team and the potential of attracting an
NBA team for the project have been debated among public forums.

The

University of Louisville’s current men’s and women’s basketball facility is
Freedom Hall, a facility the state of Kentucky owns and maintains through the
Kentucky State Fair Board. Freedom Hall was built in 1956 and is the oldest
facility in Louisville’s basketball conference, the Big East. In recent years, public
demand for tickets and for corporate “luxury boxes” have been increasing. Also,
there have been numerous scheduling conflicts in Freedom Hall between
concerts and shows such as the National Farm Machinery Show, the Louisville
Sport Boat and Recreation Show, as well as events like tractor pulls and rodeos.
Simply put, with the University of Louisville being the primary tenant, Freedom
Hall has lost opportunities at attracting other events to the arena.
In March 2005, Kentucky Governor Ernie Fletcher appointed the Louisville
Arena Taskforce, which set out to examine the potential of constructing a new
sports arena in Louisville. The task force consisted of area business leaders,
elected officials and retired sports marketing expert, Jim Host. The arena
taskforce was charged in examining a sports arena to maximize the economic
development for the city of Louisville and the Commonwealth of Kentucky.
After a five-month study, the Louisville Arena Taskforce made a set of
recommendations to Governor Fletcher proposing the arena be located in a
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downtown area. Initially, the taskforce studied two locations. These locations
were the “Waterfront /Louisville Gas and Electric Site” and the “Water Company”
site, respectively. With a vote of 12-4, the taskforce ultimately recommended the
Louisville Waterfront site for numerous reasons. The first consideration was that
the site offered enough room to build a 22,000-seat facility, where the “Water
Company” site would house arena that estimated around 18,000 seats. This is
smaller than Freedom Hall is currently.
Second, the Waterfront site was close to recent downtown investments
such as Fourth Street Live, the Muhammad Ali Center, Waterfront Park and
offered the destination appeal of the Kentucky International Convention Center.
This was viewed as a positive by leaders in that visitors could be within a
reasonable walking distance to downtown attractions. Third, the committee
constantly emphasized the ability of the arena to serve as an “architectural” icon
for the city of Louisville. Because the Waterfront site is located on the Ohio River
and would be easily visible by interstate travelers on I-64, the Waterfront site
would serve this purpose. The proceeding map shows where the proposed
locations are in relation to other downtown tourist and visitor destinations.
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Map of downtown Louisville with proposed Arena Locations

The downtown sites have been met with a variety of controversies from
many different groups. First, students at the University of Louisville and
residents of the south end of Jefferson County want the arena located in close
proximity to campus. Advocates in the Jefferson County delegation want the
arena located at either the fairgrounds, or the “Water Company” site because of
the cost savings to the Commonwealth as a whole. This is largely due to a large
electric substation that currently is housed on the proposed “Waterfront” site.
This substation, along with an office tower belonging to Humana, would have to
be moved at an expense of nearly $70 million to the Louisville Arena project.
Also, in the context of an NBA team playing in one of the locations, it would have
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to be a the Waterfront site due to the size of the arena that could be constructed
on that site, as opposed to the Water Company site.
In addition to the site recommendations, the Louisville Arena Taskforce
made recommendations to Governor Fletcher of how much support the state of
Kentucky should contribute into the proposed project. At the time, the project
was expected to cost approximately $300 million; however, by mid-spring 2006,
the cost had escalated to over $350 million. Despite the rise in cost, the
recommendation to the Governor and the Kentucky General Assembly was for
the state to pledge $75 million in tax-exempt bonds for the 2006-2008 biennium
budget. The city of Louisville is expected to pledged their assistance and
bonding authority to the project, and already, $100 million in private investments
have been pledge for sponsorships and luxury suite sales to help pay the debt
service. The following chart depicts the various sources of income expected to
help pay the construction costs of the new arena.
Table 1: Source of Financing for the new Arena
Sources of Financing

Amount in Millions of $

Louisville Arena Authority Bonds

$273.7

Commonwealth Bonds

$75

Parking Authority of the River City

$25.6

Metropolitan Sewer District

$6

Total

$379.7

As can be seen, the Louisville Arena is going to be operated by a public
authority established that will be allowed to issue bonds. The Commonwealth
bonds are the bonds offered by the state, and the parking authority and
metropolitan sewer revenues are the support committed by the city of Louisville.
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The 2006 Kentucky General Assembly included the $75-million bond issue
proposed for the Arena in the 2007-2008 biennium budget, but did not specify a
site, leaving it up to the Arena Authority to decide on a location. The University
of Louisville has indicated they would not be interested in playing any ballgames
in a site that did not hold more than a minimum of 20,000 people, meaning they
would only agree to be the tenant in the arena if it were located on the Louisville
Waterfront site.
Noticeably absent in the recommendations and analysis conducted by the
numerous consultants on the Louisville Arena project is the question of whether
or not the arena could be used as a dual-use facility and what the potential
revenue and economic impacts that an NBA team could have on the city of
Louisville and the entire arena project. A dual-use facility is defined as a facility
that has two “permanent” anchors that take up the majority of the events on an
annual contractual basis. Would an NBA team create new revenue for Louisville
and Jefferson County leaders to ultimately make their investment in the project
more viable and yield a greater return? Is an NBA team, as a second primary
tenant a viable option to explore to help pay the debt service obligations?
LITERATURE REVIEW
In examining the impact of an NBA team on the city of Louisville, it is
important for city leaders to understand the definition of an Economic Impact
Study. Dr. Ginny Wilson (1994) explains that the two criteria for judging an
economic impact are completeness and accuracy. Wilson (1994) explains that
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impact analysis and multiplier analysis are derived from the export base theory of
regional economics which holds that two ways that a city can increase the size of
a regional economy are to draw dollars into the region from the outside and to
keep dollars in the region, which are otherwise leaked out. Movement of dollars
within the region does not generate a net increase in the size of the regional
economy (Wilson 1994). For instance, any potential NBA team could draw fans
from across the state, and across Indiana, Ohio, Illinois and other states in close
proximity to Louisville. On a local level, the NBA team might also help prevent
local dollars being leaked out of the community to NBA teams located in nearby
Indianapolis.
Wilson (1994) also explains the importance of the definition of a region.
Wilson (1994) explains that a region can be any contiguous area. A “region” and
the boundaries of that definition in the study are important in assessing the costs
associated with a proposed project.
Another key point in economic impact analysis is the study of leakage
(Wilson 1994). If a regional economy can grow by attracting or retaining new
dollars to its economy, then it is reasonable to infer that the city and economy
could grow in size; but this does not occur because the new dollars attracted or
retained could eventually leak out of the region as individuals purchase goods
and services not produced in the region (Wilson 1994). In terms of industry,
multipliers are best understood as in indication of the relative strength of the
linkages of a particular industry to the rest of regional economy (Wilson 1994). To
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help account for leakage, economists are able to use multipliers, which reflect the
degree to which an initial dollar recalculates through the regional economy before
it leaks out of the system (Wilson 1994). For the study of attracting an NBA team
to the city of Louisville, it is important to take into account the impact on dollars
within the region, which in this study, will be Jefferson County only.
John Siegfried and Andrew Zimbalist (2002) wrote specifically to Wilson’s
(1994) points that sports multipliers are an attempt to measure how new local
spending is created through the sports arena and teams creation. The use of
multipliers in the promotional studies typically assume the athletes, who take part
in these professional sports activities, spend, save and invest like the average
individual in the region. This is one of the big reasons, according to experts, that
promotional studies that are used to defend the construction of a new facility,
which are usually conducted by the promoters of the venue, have a greater
economic impact than those done by independent groups or individual citizens.
John Siegfried and Andrew Zimbalist (2000) took a look at the economics
of sports facilities and impact on the communities in which they were built. They
highlighted three major reasons why there are often overestimates of revenues in
studies for arena projects: the substitution effect, leakages and the negative
effect on local government. Siegfried and Zimbalist’s ideas are reinforced by
Wilson (1994) in the idea of leakage in any project and examination of economic
impact.
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Siegfried and Zimbalist (2000) explain the “substitution effect” using the
basic economic principal that individuals in the community have a fixed amount
of income to spend on leisure activities. This theory accompanies Wilson’s
explanation in the respect that sports arenas simply “shift” the spending from one
area of the region (in this case of this project, Jefferson County), to anothertherefore, no “new spending” is created. Promotional studies, however, usually
counter this argument with statistics about out-of-town fans attending sporting
events. In theory, sports arenas are able to attract spending from outsiders that
they claim would not normally be able to attract with their own residents’ “leisure”
activities. Siegfried and Zimbalist (2000) argue against the promoter’s points in
their text stating that if there were no sports venues in that particular region, then
the people traveling would essentially spend their money on other forms of
leisure.
In terms of local governments, Siegfried and Zimbalist (2000) claim that
the negative budgetary impact created by the construction of a sports arena
cancels any positive impact created. This is due to the financing and lease terms
of the sports arenas to the teams and the role they play in determining the
economic impact upon taxpayers. Also, there are the added costs associated
with arenas such as police traffic control, public safety and improvements in
signage, lighting and other items around the facilities. Siegfried and Zimbalist
explain that usually the state and local governments of these regions have to
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implement a variety of taxing methods to make the arenas financially viable, thus,
creating a sort of government “subsidy” for the arena projects.
Janet Ward (1991) feels that professional sports teams and arenas are not
worth the trouble and their opportunity cost is low compared to other government
projects. Although the government may not realize a large return on investment
by investing in the construction and management of sports arenas, it is important
understand the rate of return might not be as high if the government were to have
invested that same money into other projects. Ward claims that very little sales
tax revenue is generated from these projects, and local governments who spend
their money on these projects have to take away money from other needs in the
community such as police and fire protection, libraries, public transportation and
other social services.
Louisville Metro leaders must also consider the implications of the
financing they choose to construct the arena, whichever proposal is chosen.
Citigroup prepared a great summary of arena bonding and the implications to the
Louisville Arena Taskforce through the Commonwealth of Kentucky Office of
Financial Management (2005). Throughout the 1960’s and 70’s, bonds for these
facilities were supported by general fund revenues. In the mid-1970’s, a shift
occurred that called for bonds being supported by revenues directly or indirectly
linked to the economic development these projects brought to the community.
For the last twenty years, bonds for sport complexes have been supported
by multiple revenue streams. These include the increase of private participation,
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participation by city, county and state governments and even the revenue and
profit that the facility brought in from naming rights, sales of personal seat
licenses and the so-called “luxury boxes”, which are sold to individuals or
corporations with deep pockets for the purpose of entertaining guests (Citigroup,
2005). In recent times, secure revenue sources such as premium seating,
naming rights, sponsorships and luxury boxes have enabled arena financing to
achieve higher investment grade ratings and bond insurance commitments.
Historically, general obligation bonds have been used in these projects if
full-faith and credit of the municipality is pledged. This is usually the strongest
form of financial support in the financing approach (Citigroup 2005). Other
examples important to the Louisville Arena are the dedicated tax revenue bonds
in the region. These dedicated taxes can pay for the bonds through the sales
tax, hotel taxes, rental car taxes, food and beverage taxes, tax increment
districts, business development districts, professional sports development district
taxes, parking taxes and ticket taxes to name a few (Citigroup 2005).
When issuing these municipal bonds, Citigroup (2005) discusses
important reservations when considering the credit issues that come from
municipal bonds. Namely, the project must have pledged political support for the
revenues (Citigroup 2005). In the Arena project, this would come from the
pledge from the Kentucky General Assembly and the Louisville Metro
Government. Underlying Economic Support is also critical, which can be viewed
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by the work of mayor Abramson and Greater Louisville Inc., which has pledged a
quarter of the cost of the new arena.
Citigroup also examined the viability of the private financing goals that the
Louisville Arena Taskforce and Louisville Metro leaders should set out to
determine. The goals included tenants of the new arena, such as the University
of Louisville, or in the purpose of this study, a potential NBA franchise and the
University of Louisville. For private funding, there are important funding sources
for the project. These six items include the luxury suites, club seats, naming
rights to the facility, advertising/sponsorship within the arena, parking and
concessions and novelties (Citigroup 2005).
Something critical in the consideration of building the Louisville Arena for
use by both an NBA team and the University of Louisville is the Federal Tax
Status. To be tax-exempt, bonds must fail at least one of the two tests
established under the Tax Reform Act of 1986. First, is the private business test.
The private use test is if more than ten percent of the proceeds of the issue will
be used (directly or indirectly) by a private business (hockey, arena football,
concerts). The second is the private payment test (financing secured by naming
rights, sponsorships, premium seating, etc.)- if the payment of the principal of, or
the interest on, more than ten percent of the proceeds is directly or indirectly
secured by any interest in property used by a private business or to be derived
from payments from property used by a private business (Citigroup 2005). In
many cities, the facilities that NBA teams use are usually always taxable bonds,
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because a privately held company (NBA team) receives the benefits of the bond
issue, thus the cost to the taxpayers are higher because the taxable bonds are
not as a competitive market as the non-taxable bonds. This is important
information to keep in mind when considering how an NBA team can use the
Louisville Arena and not change the type of bonds that could be issued.
Kelly Smith wrote an extensive report on the value of professional sports
franchises in her report: “Valuing Professional Sports Franchises: An
Econometric Approach.” In the report, Smith (2004) used the principal that the
value of any business is based on its potential for future economic earnings.
There are three common approaches to valuation, the cost or asset based
approaching, the market/sales comparison, and the income approach (Smith
2004). Smith prefers the later two approaches when placing a value on sports
teams. The market/sales comparison uses principals of competition in a free
market and relies on the assumption that, in an aquarium, the price of an
investment will apply to similar investments, with some minor modifications
(Smith 2004). The income approach, simply stated, is the value of the team is
based directly on the present value of the expected cash flow earned for the
duration of the enterprise (Smith 2004). This is important to Louisville because
when examining the possibility of landing an NBA team in the city, the city and
region has to be attractive enough to a potential investor, as well as the NBA to
warrant allowing a team to locate there.
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When examining statistics and the value of an NBA team, Smith used a
variety of descriptive statistics to examine the worth of an NBA team and what
economic impact that team brings to the community. For instance, as the
number of viewers watching an NBA team located in the area increases, the
more people are exposed to that team and may want to attend one of their
games in person. The more populous the city, the more local television revenue
the team will generate from the sales of endorsements and exclusive media
rights. Finally, a large, local fan base can have a positive effect on the
merchandising and licensing revenue of the NBA team (Smith 2004). These
facts are important to Louisville because the city must be able to be competitive
their demographics in relation to per-capita income, size of the population and
number of employers in the region in order to attract an NBA team.
Siegfried and Zimbalist (2000) claim the “unmeasureables” of sports
arenas are important factors when realizing the economic impact of sports
facilities. Siegfried and Zimbalist assert that sports arenas can help initiate the
process of core redevelopment. According to the authors, this is because sports
arenas offer the cities and regions they serve an opportunity to reposition the
economic activity within a metropolitan area. Siegfried and Zimbalist also suggest
that only a sports arena that is surrounded by a year-round business district or
residential neighborhood will attract substantial independent investment to that
area. This is important to the city of Louisville when considering where the arena
should be constructed. Based on these findings, the arena has to go downtown,
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which leaves lawmakers with two choices on where to locate the arena.
However, based on the desires to make it a cultural icon, as well as make it big
enough for UofL’s use, it must go on the Waterfront site.
Siegfried and Zimbalist agree with the Louisville Arena Taskforce in the
sense that the arena has the opportunity to put a city “on the map”. They agree
that the sports arena promotions in regional, national and even international
media coverage can have a positive effect on the tourism and economic
development activities from a promotional standpoint. This is a psychological
effect in that a major arena brings to the visitors’ minds the idea they view in the
media. The visual sends a message according to the authors that if the cities are
able to attract this type of sports venue, then it also could attract, or has
attracted, other cultural resources and opportunities like theatres, operas, art
galleries, and parks. The economic impact of the sports arena might be
exaggerated, but the intangible good such as civic pride is unquantifiable.
This raises the question, are the unquantifiable, intangible benefits
associated with the Waterfront Site commensurate with the extra cost to build the
arena on that site? Granted, only the Waterfront Site would hold an arena big
enough to meet UofL’s and the Louisville Arena Authorities’ demands, but the
fact remains that it is a debatable issue and one that could be examined after
the arena is constructed. This could be done by using surveys after construction
of the arena to see if visitors to Louisville report that the intangible “image”
portrayed by the arena had any influence on them wanting to visit Louisville.
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This study will not answer those questions, but it is worth considering if the arena
is built on the Waterfront Site, despite its extra costs.
Zartesky is a strong proponent that the increased tax revenues that cities
expect to receive from their investment are not necessarily “new” money.
Zaretsky claims that the studies often overlook, or outright ignore, the fact that
the facilities often do not bring in new revenues into the city or metropolitan
areas, but often the revenues are just substitutes for those that would have been
raised by other activities (Zartesky 2001). This is due to budget constraints,
which implies that households only have so much money to spend, particularly
on entertainment. If the family chooses to spend the money at the arena then
that money cannot be spent at the mall, thus no new revenues are being
generated to the city.
Zaretsky makes the case that public funds for a stadium can only generate
new revenues for a city if one of the following situations occur: 1.) the funds
generate new spending by people from outside the area who otherwise would not
have come to town 2.) the funds cause area residents to spend money locally
that would not have spent there otherwise 3.) the funds keep turning over locally,
therefore creating “new spending” (Zaretsky 2001). This is exactly what this
study examines- can an NBA team generate enough new spending by people
outside the area who would not otherwise come to town to help meet the debt
service requirements of the Louisville Arena and generate a benefit to the City of
Louisville over the construction of a single-use facility?
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METHODOLOGY
This paper will present the amount of new tax revenues that the city of
Louisville, Kentucky will/will not, receive from the operation of the new Louisville
Arena as a dual-use facility that will be built on the “Waterfront Site.” The report
provides a comparison if the arena is built for a single-use facility for the
University of Louisville and if the arena were constructed for two primary tenantsthe University of Louisville and a potential NBA team.
The paper will help assist Louisville Metro Government members, mayor
Jerry Abramson and members of the Kentucky General Assembly from the City
of Louisville in determining how the arena should be constructed and if the
money that it would take to construct an NBA facility would be worth the extra
cost in the amount it would return to the city.
A literature review was conducted to support the need and relevancy for
the research desired before Louisville Arena construction begins. It was also
used to identify the factors and characteristics which will lead to the data and
ways to analyze the data in arena projects. The literature review also examined
other cities results with arena projects and factors to examine to determine
success or failure.
The data for this study on the impacts of an NBA team will come from a
report published by the city of Memphis in May, 2001 which was prepared by The
University of Memphis Regional Economic Development Center. The University
of Memphis completed this report as an independent analysis for city of Memphis
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lawmakers and was not intended to be bias in the findings to advocate for a
certain cause. The city of Memphis is a comparable with the city of Louisville for
the following reasons:
1.) Memphis and Louisville are eighteenth and sixteenth, respectfully, in
their size according to 2000 Census Data. Louisville Metro has a
population of 700,300 and Memphis has a population of 671,929.
2.) Memphis and Louisville are similar in geographic location. Both are on
the Mississippi “flyway”, both are on borders with other states and both
are located in the Southeast United States.
3.) Memphis is a good comparison because it represents a recent move in
the NBA of a team from another city.
4.) The FedEx forum, located in downtown Memphis is a dual-use facility.
The arena is used by both the Memphis Grizzlies NBA team, as well as
the University of Memphis for their home basketball games.
5.) The FedEx Forum was built across town from another arena, the
Pyramid that housed the University of Memphis at the time. This is
similar to what would happen with Freedom Hall if the Louisville Arena
were constructed.
6.) The demographics of the Memphis and Louisville are similar in their
Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA)
7.) Characteristics. Both have similar per capita incomes ($30,559 for
Memphis and $31,251 for Louisville) and both are similar in the amount

Harpole, 21

of companies they have with 250+ employees (450 for Memphis and
458 for Louisville).
The Greater Louisville MSA is compromised of thirteen counties- these
include Bullitt, Henry, Jefferson, Meade, Oldham, Nelson, Shelby, Spencer and
Trimble Counties in Kentucky. Clark, Floyd, Harrison and Washington counties
are in Indiana. The total population of the MSA is 1,200,847 individuals. This is
very similar to the MSA of the City of Memphis, which is 1,147,825 thus
solidifying the comparison between the City of Memphis and the City of
Louisville.
Immediate leakage was impossible to examine in this study. It is
impossible to predict player salaries, coaching salaries, travel costs, staff salaries
and other items that would leave the City of Louisville if an NBA team were to
locate in the city.
This data will also be updated in this report to reflect the twelve percent
increase in the Consumer Price Index (CPI) due to inflation in accordance with
the U.S. Department of Labor- Bureau of Labor Statistics from 2001 to 2006.
There are limitations to this analysis including assumptions that are
mentioned in the results which find 58% of those in attendance of a potential
NBA game in the new arena would be from outside the Louisville/Metro Area and
that these are new visitors there entirely for the NBA game- not necessarily those
that would be in Louisville for another form of entertainment. This is an
assumption based on the facts from the University of Memphis report, which is
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assumed that would work for Louisville as well due to the comparisons in MSAs
and demographics. Until an actual NBA event takes place and a survey can be
conducted, it is impossible to know exactly how many of those in attendance
would be from outside the MSA and in attendance for the game because the
NBA team is there, not necessarily substituting the NBA game for another form of
entertainment in Louisville/Jefferson County.
RESULTS
The current proposal from the Louisville Arena Task Force to Governor
Fletcher is for an arena to be constructed that will feature 22,000 permanent
seats, with 72 luxury suites. The cost for the arena, including all site acquisition
and preparation is projected at $354.4 million. This proposal calls for the
University of Louisville men and women’s basketball games to be the primary
tenant for the arena. So where does the current Louisville Arena stand in terms
of being able to hold an NBA team and facility?
When examining the current proposed arena facility for the Louisville
Waterfront, the Louisville Arena Authority has basically proposed an “NBA Grade
Arena” for Louisville. Of course, building it to NBA standards means that it far
exceeds college basketball standards. When studying the top-15 college
basketball arenas by size, the average number of seats is 20,456 with 35 luxury
permanent luxury boxes per facility. Louisville’s proposed arena is going to beat
both of those numbers with 22,000 seats and 72 luxury boxes.
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When examining the NBA arenas that have been constructed over the
past ten years (to 1996), the proposed Louisville Arena fairs very well too. The
following chart compares the number of seats, luxury boxes and cost of the
arenas that have been constructed in the last ten years.
Table 2: Size and Cost of NBA Arenas constructed since 1996
City

Year Completed

Number of Seats Number of Luxury Boxes

Atlanta

1999

20,000

Charlotte

2005

Dallas

2001

Cost in Millions

92

$213

18,500

37

$265

19,200

142

$420

Denver

1999

18,129

95

$165

Houston

2003

18,300

79

$175

Indianapolis

1999

18,345

67

$183

Los Angeles

1999

18,997

162

$330

Memphis

2004

18,500

82

$250

Miami

1999

19,600

110

$175

New Orleans

1999

18,000

56

$84

Philadelphia

1996

21,600

126

$206

San Antonio

2002

18,500

82

$175

Washington, D.C.

1997

20,173

110

$260

19,064

95

$223

Average

An interesting perspective on the current Arena proposal is that the arena
meets the criteria to be home to a potential NBA team. For instance, the average
number of luxury suits in the NBA is 88. The arenas constructed in the last ten
years, the average number is 95, but this number also includes several outliers
such as the Staples Center and Dallas, which have over 140 each. In markets
the size of Louisville, 72 actually is a number on the high end of the scale. In
simple terms, the proposed Louisville Arena is “NBA ready”.
The FedExForum in Memphis is home to sixty luxury boxes, twelve less
than the amount proposed by the Louisville Arena. Also, in the NBA “small
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markets” the average results in 45 suites per arena. Considering that, the
amount of luxury boxes to be constructed in the proposed Louisville Arena are
adequate for an NBA team. Additionally, the NBA average capacity in the arenas
is 19,353. The proposed 22,000 seats in the proposed Louisville Arena are
adequate in that arena as well.
So where does Louisville stand on the probability of getting an NBA team
and what would it take to get one to locate one in Louisville? According to Sports
Economics, an independent sports consulting firm who has clients such as the
NBA, MLB, NFL, NASCAR and other major sport organizations, the city of
Louisville ranks very high on the list of cities who should land an NBA team.
When examining these findings, Sports Economics consultants ranks Louisville
second highest (at .649 out of 1.00) for probable locations for an NBA team, only
behind San Diego (.85) on the list of cities without an NBA team. In fact,
Louisville ranks higher than five cities that already have an NBA team for the
feasibility for locations (Miami, San Antonio, Milwaukee, Cleveland and
Sacramento). Also, Sports Economics ranks Louisville second highest in the
potential gate receipts, of cities that do not have an NBA team, behind Hartford,
Connecticut, and above eight cities that already have NBA teams in their towns
(Los Angeles Clippers, Sacramento, Milwaukee, Charlotte, Dallas, Orlando,
Cleveland, New Orleans, Denver).
When examining the recent transactions of NBA teams, there has been
one expansion team added (Charlotte) and two moves recently (the Charlotte
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Bobcats to New Orleans and Vancouver Grizzlies to Memphis). The average
price of an NBA franchise in 2003 was $252.4 million.

While the investors in

Charlotte gave the NBA $300 million for the rights to a franchise, teams could
possibly be purchased from smaller markets for the average prices. Teams such
as the Golden State Warriors, Milwaukee Bucks, New Orleans Hornets and
Seattle Supersonics are all valued below the $252.4 million average. In other
words, these teams could probably be purchased from their owners for the $300
million league expansion league price that was established with the sale of
Bobcat Franchise to Charlotte a few years ago. The cost and value of NBA
teams are examined in the following chart:
Table 3: Worth and Purchase Price of Current NBA Teams
City
Atlanta
Boston
Charlotte
Chicago
Dallas
Denver
Detroit
Oakland
Houston
Indianapolis
Los Angeles
Los Angeles
Memphis
Miami
Milwaukee
Minnesota
Newark
New Orleans
New York
Sacramento
Philadelphia
Phoenix

Team Name 2003 Worth ($ Millions) Recent Purchase Price ($ in millions)
Hawks
$206
Celtics
$274 360 (2002)
Bobcats
$300 $300 (2002)
Bulls
$323
Mavericks
$304*
Nuggets
$209 $202
Pistons
$258
Warriors
$176
Rockets
$255
Pacers
$246
Clippers
$205
Lakers
$426
Grizzlies
$198 $160 (2000)
Heat
$250
Bucks
$168
Timberwolves
$213
Nets
$218
Hornets
$172
Knicks
$398
Kings
$259
76ers
$298
Suns
$272
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Portland
San Antonio
Seattle
Toronto
Utah
Washington

Trailblazers
Spurs
Supersonics
Raptors
Jazz
Wizards

$270
$242
$207 $250 (2001)
$217
$226
$278
Average $252.4

*Dallas Mavericks price reflects 50% ownership in arena.
An interesting perspective on the Sports Economics’ findings is that New
Orleans actually ranked so poorly in both potential location models and estimated
gate revenues. Despite this, the Hornets still moved to New Orleans from
Charlotte and the NBA approved this move, even though Louisville would have
been a much better choice based on the initial research by the independent
Sports Economic firm. The New Orleans television market was also smaller
than that of Charlotte. So what influenced the Hornets decision? According to
the The Sports Economics consultants the primary reason the Hornets moved
from Charlotte to New Orleans was undoubtedly the more appealing facility
agreement, with a more state of the art facility, that New Orleans offered the
team compared to the deal Charlotte proposed.
The Sports Economic consultants also makes a compelling argument that
Louisville is a prime spot for a potential NBA team and was a front runner for two
of the relocations (Charlotte to New Orleans, Vancouver to Memphis), the only
thing holding the teams back from locating to Louisville was an NBA-grade arena
for the team to play in. Under the current proposal for the new Louisville Arena
project, that will no longer be a problem for a potential NBA team wanting to
locate to Louisville, or for an expansion team to locate in Louisville.
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As examined in the Literature Review, one of the critical components of
any new arena is how much “new” revenue the facility would generate over the
facility it replaces. The literature review supports the economic theory that the
impact analysis and multiplier analysis are derived from the base theory of
regional economics. The only way that Louisville is able to increase the size of a
regional economy is to draw dollars into the region from the outside and to keep
dollars in the region, which are otherwise leaked out. According to Wilson (1994)
movement of dollars within the region does not generate a net increase in the
size of the regional economy. If the proposed arena is constructed as a singleuse facility, the results show that this is going to happen in the city of Louisville.
There will be relatively few dollars spent inside the Jefferson County from outside
the region. Currently, the proposed Louisville Arena would have to host
approximately 113 events per year to break even for the first ten years of
operation. The chart below depicts these findings :
Table 4: Proposed Events at the New Arena
Event
UofL Men's Basketball Game
UofL Women's Basketball Game
Concerts-Other
Family Shows
NCAA Events
Sporting Events
Tradeshows
Misc
Total

New Arena (expected) Notes
18
15
18
28 Based on estimate
2
12
10 Based on estimate
10 Based on estimate
113

This includes an estimated eighteen UofL men’s basketball games, fifteen
UofL women’s basketball games, two NCAA tournaments (in a ten year period),
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eighteen concerts, twenty eight family shows, twelve other sporting events (such
as University of Kentucky basketball games, KHSAA Sweet 16 Tournaments and
the remaining eighty-two events will have to be made up of other events such as
consumer shows, circuses, wrestling and tractor pulls. Another interesting
perspective is the 113 events per year average also include two NCAA
Tournaments in the given life cycle of the bond payment. While every attempt
has been made by the Louisville Arena Authority to build the arena to the
specifications required today to hold an NCAA event, this does not guarantee
Louisville will host an NCAA event.
To contrast these numbers, Freedom Hall on average, hosted 138 events
per year, in the years 2003-2004. This is depicted in the table below:
Table 5: Freedom Hall Scheduled Events Currently and After New Arena Opens
Event
Freedom Hall (current) Freedom Hall after new arena
UofL Men's Basketball Game
18
0
UofL Women's Basketball Game
10
0
Louisville Fired Arena Football
8
8
Minor League Hockey
0
36
Concerts-Other
10
6
KY State Fair Concerts
4
4
Family Shows
2
6
Ice Shows
0
2
NCAA Events
0
0
Motorsports
3
3
NFMS Tractor Pull
4
4
Sporting Events
6
2
Horse/Livestock Shows
36
36
Tradeshows
27
30
Misc
8
8
Total
138
143
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These include eighteen UofL men’s basketball games, ten UofL women’s
basketball games, eight Louisville Fire (Arena Football) games, ten concerts not
associated with the Kentucky State Fair, four concerts associated with the State
Fair, two family shows, two ice shows, three motorsports events, four tractor
pulls, thirty-six horse/livestock shows, twenty-seven tradeshows/conventions and
eight miscellaneous events. An understanding of these numbers, when looking
at events that could potentially move from Freedom Hall to the new Arena
reveals that, only 73 of the 138 events have the possibility to move from
Freedom Hall to the new Arena.
This is due to many of the horse/livestock shows being associated with the
Kentucky State Fair. Also, the Louisville Fire Minor League Arena football team
has a long-term contract with Freedom Hall, and the Kentucky State Fair
concerts would remain on the Fair Grounds. Also, the proposed new arena will
not have ice below the playing surface; therefore, no ice skating events could
take place there. In the end, when the new arena is constructed and opened,
experts agree that Freedom Hall will lose $1.15 million in revenue per year
beginning in the year 2010. This is $1.15 million that is transferred to the new
arena from the difference in events.
The Louisville Arena Authority and the Kentucky State Fair Board, who will
be operating the new facility, can rely on a minimum of forty-five additional dates
to add to the total, resulting in the 113 dates it takes to break even if an NBA
team is attracted to Louisville. The NBA-regular season now consists of an
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average of 90 games, including four preseason games that are split between two
home games, and two away games. If an NBA team could co-anchor the arena,
the forty-five games it could provide a year would improve the amount of debt
service that could be paid from the use of the arena as a dual-purpose facility.
Since the proposed arena is “NBA ready”, it is necessary to analyze the
potential revenue and economic impact an NBA team co-anchoring the arena,
along with UofL, would have on the city of Louisville and the arena project. To
analyze and study this, a comparison was done, as mentioned previously, with a
report the University of Memphis published in 2001 for the city of Memphis’s
lawmakers who were facing a similar situation as Louisville lawmakers.
As mentioned previously, the FedExForum and the city of Memphis are
similar to that of Louisville in both size of the MSA and the demographics, such
as per capita income ($30,559 for Memphis and $31,251 for Louisville) and
companies with 250+ employees (450 for Memphis, 458 for Louisville). The MSA
is important because it represents the region the new arena and a potential NBA
team would be drawing from, thus bringing in new dollars to Louisville/Jefferson
County.
Based on calculations from Memphis and applying them in present dollars
for the city of Louisville, the spectator total impact in arena expenditures is $15.7
million. Most importantly is that the $15.7 million figure is distributed between
local residents inside the city of Louisville and for those outside the
Louisville/Jefferson County region.

Harpole, 31

Because “new” revenue impacts on the city of Louisville and Jefferson
County are of concern, it can be assumed that there will be at a minimum of
forty-five NBA games in the new arena. Also, no events will take place in the
arena after the NBA game (in other words, the people are there for the NBA
game only), twenty percent of the new visitor spending will be from the
spectators of an NBA game. All of these assumptions are aligned with NBA
studies conducted in Memphis and NBA markets across the nation.
Another interesting statistic are the numbers which are comparable from
Memphis Ticketmaster Information on the amount of tickets sold inside the
Memphis MSA and outside the MSA. Once again, this data is comparable for
Louisville because the per capita income is virtually the same for the two areas.
For example, the Memphis Grizzlies draw from 38% of their crowd from outside
Shelby County, Tennessee and an additional 20% of their spectators from
outside the 75-mile radius of the arena. Based on this fact, 58% of the
spectators in attendance at any given Memphis Grizzlies NBA basketball game
are from outside the city of Memphis. This fact, coupled with the similar
demographics and methodology mentioned previously can be transferred safely
to a comparison with the city of Louisville and Jefferson County. (Limitations to
this information are discussed in the Methodology section of this study.)
If these assumptions are reliable, and there is no information in the
research to say that they are not, non-local resident incremental expenditures for
an NBA team will be $11.2 million annually. This will have a direct impact on the
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city of Louisville/Jefferson County of $5.2 million annually. When considering
outside residents of the area expenditures, such as day-trippers and overnight
visitors to Louisville/Jefferson County the amount of new money generated by an
NBA team increases. If an NBA team is brought into Louisville, an additional $
10.8 million annually can be brought in from day-trippers and overnight visitors to
the region. Together with the amount of non-local resident expenditures, an NBA
team could have an additional revenue impact of $16.1 million annually on the
Louisville/Jefferson County economy.
It must be understood that under the limitations stated, this is presumed
to be all new money coming into Louisville and Jefferson County, not simply new
revenue moved from one location in the area. Under the proposed single-use
facility, simply moving a UofL basketball game from Freedom Hall to the new
arena is not generating any new money for Louisville and Jefferson County, with
the possible exception of the few extra seats that the new arena has over
Freedom Hall. Nonetheless, based on the limited draw of the region/state the
University of Louisville enjoys and considering that audience is already
established in the city of Louisville at Freedom Hall, the proposed single-use
facility would transfer the money that would be spent in one area of the city (the
Fairgrounds) to another arena/entertainment venue (the Waterfront site).
The statistics and numbers address the displacement issue of an NBA
team. Displacement occurs when the economic activity an NBA team and arena
generates impacts the economy in another form had the arena not been built; for
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example, going to a movie instead of the NBA game. When examining new
money created by an NBA team into Louisville and Jefferson County from
outside the county, displacement is not an issue, due to the reality that 58% of
the attendance from outside Jefferson County and can be assumed to travel to
the region (Louisville/Jefferson County) for the NBA game only. Of this 58%,
perhaps their local communities are losing money, but Louisville and Jefferson
County stand to earn this new money from an NBA team.
When examining the potential NBA impact on the debt service payment,
the amount can be examined from a perspective of the commitments that have
already been made towards the Louisville Arena. First, as mentioned earlier,
there is a two-dollar service charge on all tickets for the arena. If a NBA team in
Louisville reaches the 2004-2005 attendance average for all NBA teams, they will
have 17,059 fans per game. Multiply this number by forty-five and you receive
an annual average of 767,655 individuals in attendance annually. Multiply this by
the two-dollar ticket surcharge created by the construction of the new Louisville
arena and the NBA team could generate an additional $1.5 million annually for
the first sixteen years in ticket fees for debt service and $2.3 million annually after
the ticket increment goes to three dollars after the sixteenth year of operation of
the arena.
When considering the new Louisville Arena, naming rights have been
commonly referred to as a major source of revenue to help pay debt service.
Naming rights have become a fixture across the country as subsidies for arena
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and stadium construction on both professional and collegiate levels. When
studying the issue of naming rights in various college and professional arenas
there appears to be a wide division on the amount a company will pay to put their
name on an arena for a college team and what they will put their name on the
arena used by a professional sporting team. The following chart offers a
comparison between the different amounts paid in naming rights to all the NBA
arenas with naming rights and all of the NCAA arenas with naming rights.
Table 6: NBA / NCAA Naming Rights
City
Atlanta
Boston
Chicago
Dallas
Denver
Houston
Indianapolis
Los Angeles
Memphis
Miami
Minneapolis
East Rutherford
Orlando
Philadelphia
Phoenix
Sacramento
San Antonio
Seattle
Toronto
Washington
Average

NBA Naming Rights
Arena Name
Annual Amount Paid
Phillips Arena
$8,400,000
FleetCenter
$2,000,000
United Center
$1,250,000
American Airlines Center
$6,500,000
Pepsi Center
$3,400,000
Toyota Center
$5,000,000
Conseco Fieldhouse
$2,000,000
Staples Center
$5,000,000
FedExForum
$4,500,000
American Airlines Arena
$2,100,000
Target Center
$1,250,000
Continental Airlines Arena
$2,416,000
TD Waterhouse Center
$1,560,000
Wachovia Center
$1,290,323
America West Arena
$866,667
Arco Arena
$700,000
SBC Center
$2,050,000
Key Arena
$1,000,000
Air Canada Center
$2,000,000
MCI Center
$3,384,615
$2,936,584
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NCAA Naming Rights
University
Name
Annual Amount
Notes
Boise State
Taco Bell Arena
$266,667
U of CO.
Coors Events Conf. Center
$5,000,000 one time
Canissus College
HSBC Arena
$800,000
U of MD
Comcast Center
$800,000
U of SC
Colonial Center
$458,333
Ohio State
Value City
$12,500,000 one time
Fresno State
Save Mart Center
$200,000
Siena College
Pepsi Arena
$300,000
Texas Tech
United Spirit Center
$500,000
U of Memphis
FedExForum
$4,500,000
U of WI
Kohl Center
$25,000,000 one time
Creighton U
Qwest Center
$933,333
NC State
RBC Center
$4,000,000
U of IL
Allstate Arena
$110,000
San Diego St.
Cox Arena
$1,000,000
U of SD
Jenny Craig Pavilion
$7,000,000 one time
U of WA
Bank of America Arena
$900,000
St. Louis U
Savvis Center
$3,600,000
Syracuse U
Carrier Dome
$2,750,000 one time
AZ State U
Wells Fargo Arena
$500,000
Annual Average
$1,257,889
Annual College Only Average
$632,143

Currently, the projection for the naming rights to the proposed Louisville
Arena on the Water Front Site is $1.3 million for year one, followed by $620,000
for the next four years and $1.01 million for the following years. Although this
amount represents “new money” the money measured by the naming rights is
could be used for debt service payments or operation costs of the new arena.
The naming rights bring in no tax revenue, nor do they generate any public good
other than subsidizing tax dollars that will go into debt service payments.
Naming rights are important subsidies in arena construction projects. In
examining the college arenas across the country that have sold their naming
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rights, the average annual amount paid for the naming rights was $1.2 million.
However, this amount represents several outliers. Namely this includes three
arenas that host professional NBA or NHL teams. Those arenas include the
FedExForum in Memphis (NBA Grizzlies and Memphis University); the RBC
Center that hosts the NC State and the NHL Hurricanes; and the Savvis Center
that hosts St. Louis University and the NHL Blues.
With the removal of these outliers, the amount of revenue generated from
naming rights contracts decreases dramatically. The annual average amount
goes from $1.2 million to $632,143 annually for arenas. This is more than half
the amount decreased from having a single use facility over a dual-use facility.
This should be contrasted with the NBA Arena naming rights. Considering that
some of the arenas are in large markets, such as New York, Chicago, Houston
and Los Angeles, the average amount paid by corporations is $2.9 million for the
naming rights of NBA facilities. The $2.9-million in naming rights that NBA
facilities receive is more than quadruple the amount that single-use college
facilities receive in naming rights. Some of the larger cities, such as Los
Angeles, Dallas and Atlanta have naming rights greater than $5 million because
their arenas are home to both NBA teams and NHL teams. Los Angeles is also a
unique situation because the Staples Center is shared by two NBA teams, the
Clippers and the Lakers, as well as the NHL Kings.
When comparing the FedExForum in Memphis to other NBA facilities, it
receives nearly double the NBA average from the naming rights ($4.5 million
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annually). Granted, this amount is still less than dual- use professional facilities
(such as the Staples Center); it is, however, the highest of any college arena in
the country. Based on this information, it is reasonable to assume that if an NBA
team was attracted to the new Louisville Arena, naming rights could be sold at
the minimum $2.5 million annual average that NBA facilities receive from selling
their naming rights, which is more than $1.2 million more annually than the
current proposal. The $2.5 million reflects the averages of cities of similar size
and marketability to Louisville for an NBA team according to the Sports
Economics firm. These cities include Denver, Indianapolis, Memphis, Miami,
Orlando and San Antonio. This makes the comparison much more accurate,
because it excludes dual-use professional facilities such as the Staples Center in
Los Angeles and Philips Arena in Atlanta.
Another additional income source should an NBA team be attracted to
Louisville is the dramatic increase in price that the Louisville Arena Authority can
sell the luxury suites for. In the NBA, the lowest price for a luxury box in any
arena is $128,017 with some going as high as $231,203. To be safe, if the
seventy-two Luxury Boxes could be sold on the low-end average of $128,017,
$9.2 million in annual revenue could be generated. This is an additional $3.1
million that could be generated over the current single-use facility.
The critical element when considering the construction of the new
Louisville Arena and its current proposal of a single-use facility is the fact that
there is relatively no “new” money that would be created for the city of Louisville,
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and those having to pay the debt service, from UofL men’s basketball games.
Freedom Hall’s current capacity of 18,865 is only 3135 seats less than the
proposed 22,000-seat arena for the Waterfront site. The average attendance of
University of Louisville men’s basketball games in Freedom Hall is nearly 100percent capacity (18,746). As mentioned previously, the current proposal for
revenue to pay the debt service to the new arena calls for a $2 per ticket
surcharge that will be used for debt service, increasing to $3 per ticket in the
sixteenth year of operation. Assuming that the new arena runs 99% capacity for
the life of the arena, that translates to only $6270 per game over what could be
assessed at Freedom Hall in years one through fifteen and $9405 per game in
years sixteen through the remainder of the debt service. If an NBA team was
also in the arena, the amount generated by the ticket surcharge would increase
dramatically because these games would be new events for the arena, not
simply transferring the surcharge from one arena in Louisville to another.
The NBA average attendance in the years 2004-2005 is 17,054 per game
over the course of 45 events for the season. If the new Louisville Arena
matches the 2004-2005 average for the NBA as a whole, then it can be inferred
the arena would generate an additional $1.5 million in revenue annually from the
$2 ticket surcharge.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Based on this analysis, an NBA team would actually help benefit the City
of Louisville/Jefferson County and would dramatically help the security of
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meeting the debt service obligations on the proposed Louisville Arena Project.
The following chart shows the amount of money for the city of Louisville and the
Louisville Arena Authority that would be generated by an NBA team co-anchoring
the arena with the University of Louisville.
Table 7: Amount of new revenue generated by a dual-use arena and a single-use
facility for the city of Louisville and the Louisville Arena Authority.
Dual-Use Facility
Annual New Benefits
New Revenues
New ticket surcharge
Naming Rights
Luxury Box Sales
Concession Sales
Sum 1:
Costs
Site Acquisition
Arena Construction
Transformer Relocation
Floodwall
Project Management
Cost of Bonds
Sum 2:
Total Benefit (Sum 1-Sum 2):

Single-Use Facility

Difference

$24,664,832
$1,648,170
$2,500,000
$9,217,224
$3,800,000

$8,523,000
$112,860
$1,300,000
$5,400,000
$2,400,000

$16,141,832
$1,535,310
$1,200,000
$3,817,224
$1,400,000
$24,094,366

$20,000,000
$252,400,000
$69,000,000
$6,000,000
$7,100,000
$25,300,000
$354,400,000

$20,000,000
$252,400,000
$69,000,000
$6,000,000
$7,100,000
$25,300,000
$354,400,000

$0
$0
$0
$0
$0
$0
$0
$24,094,366

The literature review reflected statistics and numbers of professional
teams and arenas that were in actuality, detrimental to a community. However,
the research was lacking in terms of an NBA team serving as a supplemental
anchor to an arena project. Also, the numerous articles cover the construction of
arenas and stadiums for professional teams already located in the region. If an
NBA team located to Louisville/Metro Government there would actually be a net
benefit to the Louisville/Jefferson County area because NEW dollars would be
brought into the county.
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While an NBA team would more than likely have to be privately financed,
the money exists in Louisville to do so. Four Fortune 500 companies are
headquartered in Louisville and would have the financial backing to purchase an
NBA Team. In addition, John Schnattner, the founder of Papa John’s Pizza,
Hillerich and Bradsby, as well as major manufacturing plants with two Ford
Plants and General Electric. UPS’s largest hub is located in Louisville and is a
potential partner. Private investors such as Attorney J. Bruce Miller have long
been after a NBA team, but one of the biggest factors in the past was funding an
arena to house the team. This claim was backed up by the Sports Economics
consulting firm, who in an independent analysis, stated that Louisville was in the
front running for the Grizzlies when they relocated from Canada, the Hornets
when they relocated to New Orleans, and the Bobcats when they were awarded
to Charlotte. The financial backing to locate a team was in place, but the only
factor stopping those moves was the lack of financing for a “NBA ready” facility,
not the lack of investors in the franchise or the demographics needed to support
an NBA team. The current proposed arena would have to be adequate enough
to attract and house an NBA team. As a result, it is recommended that the city of
Louisville lawmakers allow the facility to be built and work with private investors
to lure an NBA team to the proposed arena.
If an NBA team is attracted, it is helpful to examine how the potential
owners of the team could generate revenue to support their business from the
arena. The Louisville Arena Authority could negotiate a potential NBA franchise
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who could use the facility free of charge and keep 95% of ticket revenues. This
means the arena would lower the amount it receives from ticket revenue from
10% (Louisville men’s basketball games) to 5% (the same it would receive for
UofL women’s basketball games), thus helping the owners of the NBA team
receive more revenue from ticket sales. The average ticket price in 2004-2005 of
an NBA team was $44.68, the two dollars for the ticket surcharge, could be
subtracted, resulting in a total of $42.68. Based on this amount the arena would
still take in $36,393 per event (based on the NBA average of 17,054 per game)
over the course of 45 events per year, thus bringing in an additional $ 1.6 to the
arena authority from ticket prices alone. It is important to note that this amount is
over and above the ticket revenues that were discussed in the analysis because
this is a recommendation to lawmakers on how to decide ticket revenues should
be divided between a potential NBA team franchise and the Louisville Arena
Authority. Add to the $1.6 million amount the $1.5 million from the two-dollar
ticket surcharge and the arena could generate an additional $3.1 million in
revenue to the Arena Authority from ticket sales alone. The NBA team could
keep the final portion of the ticket price for operating revenue and player salaries.
Under the current proposal for a single-use facility, concession revenues,
the arena would receive 39% of the first $2-million of gross revenue, 43% of
gross revenue from $2 to $3 million and 48 percent of gross revenue above $3
million. Considering this, the arena could lower its revenue percentages and the
NBA team, under a contract agreement, could also receive a cut in the
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concession revenues. With forty-five additional events, the authority could cut
the NBA franchise in for a percentage over $2 million, because it is expected that
an NBA team would generate $1.4 million in concession sales annually for the
forty-five events that the arena would host.
Concerning merchandise sales, the NBA team could be free to keep all
revenue from their own merchandise sold in the arena. The Louisville Arena
Authority plans on using the current contract that UofL has at Freedom Hall
which states that the arena will receive 10 percent of merchandise sales sold
during the UofL men’s games to a maximum of $40,000 per year. A similar deal
at Freedom Hall is going to stay the same at the proposed Louisville Arena. This
contract stipulates the arena will receive 12% of all merchandise sales on other
events, such as concerts and family shows.
A critical component in allowing the NBA franchise to play in the proposed
arena for free is the fact that they could still issue tax-exempt bonds. As pointed
out in the Literature Review, a project has to meet a certain set of criteria
established by the Federal Government to prove the case for private or public
use. According to Roger Peterman, an attorney who deals daily with the sale of
municipal bonds, if the public authority were to allow a private company to use
the facility at no cost, then it is still legal for the Louisville Arena Authority and the
state of Kentucky to issue tax-exempt bonds from the project. Peterman pointed
to an example where public university hospitals rent their space to private
practice doctors all the time to retain them in their facility. This is a similar
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practice to arenas. This would also make the Louisville Arena unique compared
to many of its professional counterparts. Facilities such as the Conseco
Fieldhouse in Indianapolis, the Great America Ballpark and Cincinnati, and the
proposed new stadium for the Colts are examples of privately held sports
franchises that have publicly financed stadiums arenas, however, the bonds
issued for those facilities were taxable because they did not meet the Federal
tax-exempt qualifications, thus costing taxpayers more in debt service payments.
CONCLUSION
In summary, this analysis concluded how a potential NBA team to the
Louisville Arena project could help pay the debt service for the Louisville Arena
Authority and bring in new revenues to the city of Louisville and Jefferson
County. The amount of money that could be generated in the form of new
revenue is contrary to the belief and theories to some of the literature that was
listed in this study. This can be attributed to a variety of reasons, but one reason
is this study is different than the studies examined in the literature review. This
study looks at a potential NBA team as a co-anchor, not a main tenant, which
means the NBA team would be a subsidy of sorts for UofL and the Louisville
Arena Authority. Also, the fact that the arena is going to be built to NBA
“standards” helps too, because there is essentially no new construction costs
associated with the project.
The results of this study were somewhat inconclusive on whether or not
the proposed arena should be constructed as a “single-use” facility of a “dual-
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use” facility. The results were inconclusive because the proposed Louisville
Arena is already going to be constructed to “NBA standards.” Therefore, the
issue on whether or not the Arena Authority should spend the extra money to
build a dual-use facility is irrelevant in this study because the arena proposed
and agreed upon is going to be constructed to “NBA standards” anyways.
This study is able to answer the question had the proposed “single-use”
arena not met the “NBA/dual-use standards” then the research showed that it
would be beneficial to the Louisville Arena Authority to construct the arena to
“NBA standards” as long as the additional cost in bonds and construction was not
more than the expected $24 million in new revenues that an NBA team would
generate. This decision would also hinge on the fact that the Louisville Arena
Authority is confident they could land an NBA team during the early years of the
arena, otherwise, the additional cost of the dual purpose facility would be
completely wasted.
The study was conclusive, however, if an NBA team could generate new
money for the city of Louisville and the Louisville Arena Authority. Through the
studies of revenue and economic impacts of NBA teams on cities with
comparable market sizes to the city of Louisville, the analysis (summarized in
Table 7) showed the amount of new revenue generated by a potential NBA team
could not only bring in new revenue to the city of Louisville, but help address the
debt service payment problems that the Louisville Arena Authority could face by
not having enough events at the arena. The fact that an NBA team could
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generate in excess of $24 million annually over and above the current proposed
single-use facility supports the idea that an NBA is a financially viable alternative
to subsidizing the arena.
This results of this study also explained why it is critical that the Louisville
Arena Authority rent the new arena to any potential new NBA team for free,
however. This will allow the Louisville Arena Authority to continue to issue its
tax-exempt bonds, which will hold the bond financing cost down. If the Arena
authority were to require any type of rent for the NBA team, the $24 million in
additional revenue could be reduced because the that debt service payments
would cost more.
Also, there are the unquantifiable facts mentioned in the literature review
and commonly spoke of, but remain inconclusive in this study. For instance, the
impression that the arena located on the waterfront has on a potential visitor
watching an NBA game on television, or the civic pride that would be instilled in
the project and potential NBA team to cheer for. Communities that support
professional sports franchises, whether they are baseball, hockey, football,
NASCAR or the NBA are believed to derive a significant benefit from the national
and sometimes international focus and media attention created by that franchise.
The advertising that comes with the NBA events, along with the media attention,
creates awareness and potential “goodwill” in the community that cannot be
quantified until after the project is completed. This translates into economic
benefits that are subtle, but meaningful to the entire city of Louisville and
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Jefferson County community, not to mention all of Kentucky. A University of
Louisville Basketball game might draw on fans from across Jefferson and
surrounding counties, an NBA team could cross the states borders surrounding
Louisville, as well as Kentucky as a whole. These results are limited, however,
until after the project is completed and surveys can be done on the true impact of
these theories.
This study will help educate Louisville Metro Council Members, the
members of the Kentucky General Assembly from Louisville and mayor Jerry
Abramson in deciding how an NBA team could be beneficial in helping meet debt
service obligations by providing additional revenues and constant dates to fill the
seats of the arena. Also, this study made suggestions on how to maximize the
potential of the Waterfront site and how creating incentives for an NBA team
would help generate new revenues for the city of Louisville/Jefferson County
While this study does not answer the question whether or not sports
arenas are poor investments for communities, it does conclude that “dual-use”
sports facilities are better investments than “single-use” facilities. It concludes
that an NBA team is a profitable co-anchor of a sports arena. A future research
study that would be interesting is to compare “single-use” professional arenas to
that of “dual-use” professional/collegiate facilities to see if a single-use
professional arena is more profitable than a single-use college facility. This study
simply examined a single-use collegiate arena to a dual-use
professional/collegiate arena.
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In closing, the Louisville Arena Authority and Louisville/Jefferson County
lawmakers should do their part in helping to attract an NBA team. This study
concluded, based on research by independent consultants, that Louisville would
be in the front running to land an NBA team, especially now that an “NBA ready”
arena is going to be constructed in Louisville. The financial impact that an NBA
team could provide to the city of Louisville and the additional guaranteed dates to
the arena’s annual schedule are hard to ignore. All of this revenue and exposure
generates a net benefit to the city of Louisville and the Louisville Arena Authority
in terms of exposure, civic pride and revenues. This new revenue could be used
to help meet the debt service obligations and reduce the burden on the taxpayers
of city of Louisville and the Commonwealth of Kentucky.
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